Nick Feamster, Jaeyeon Jung, Hari Balakrishnan
Computer Communication Review, Volume 35, Number 1, January 2005
An important factor in the robustness of the interdomain routing system
is whether the routers in autonomous systems (ASes) filter routes for
``bogon'' address space---i.e., private address space and address space
that has not been allocated by the Internet Assigned Numbers Authority
(IANA). This paper presents an empirical study of bogon route
announcements, as observed at
8 vantage points on the Internet. On average, we observe
several bogon routes leaked every few days; a small number of ASes also
temporarily leak hundreds of bogon routes. About 40% of these bogon
routes are not withdrawn for at least a day. We observed
110 different ASes originating routes for bogon prefixes and a few
ASes that were responsible for advertising a disproportionate number of
these routes. We also find that some ASes that do filter unallocated
prefixes continue to filter them for as long as five months after they
have been allocated, mistakenly filtering valid routes. Both of these
types of delinquencies have serious implications: the failure to filter
valid prefixes can could make nefarious activities such as denial of
service attacks difficult to trace; failure to update filters
when new prefixes are allocated prevents legitimate routes from being
globally visible.
[PostScript (308KB)]
Bibtex Entry:
@inproceedings{feamster2005empirical,
author = "Nick Feamster and Jaeyeon Jung and Hari Balakrishnan",
title = "{An Empirical Study of ``Bogon'' Route Advertisements}",
booktitle = {Computer Communication Review, Volume 35, Number 1},
year = {2005},
month = {January},
address = {, }
}